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Leo Kuper, in his article on the preven- 
tion of genocide, argues that a height- 
ened salience of plural divisions in 
society and polarisation of identity 
claims should be taken as the precur- 
sor to genocidal violence.' For Kuper, 
there is usually a superimposition of 
differences, territorial segregation, 
and inequality in economic and 
political participation on ethnic differ- 
entiation. Thus, organized ethno- na- 
tionalist revivalism in the context of 
coexistence of minority and majority 
communities can be identified as one 
of the most common cases for the con- 
ditions of polarization and communal 
antagonism to reach the saturation 
point of active participation in organ- 
ized political violence. 
Meanwhile, some communities are 
vulnerable to be targeted by organized 
violence more than others without any 
antecedent deterioration of their rela- 
tionship with the dominant groups. 
This is primarily due to their tradi- 
tional positioning as cultural scape- 
goats. Regarding the "cultural-others" 
of a territoriallnation state, the dehu- 
manisation of the victims of genocidal 
warfare is achieved on the basis of the 
olderbeliefs andprejudicesimplicated 
on the target group. In other words, it 
is important to make connections be- 
tween a deliberate policy of dehuman- 
ising victim populations in the process 
of their annihilation, and the historical 
roots of the cultural and ideological 
identification of victim populations as 
outsiders to a system. 
In the case of former Yugoslavia, the 
enunciation of cultural-others is a very 
difficult task. Although the main com- 
munity that is victimised through 
genocidal warfare is currently the 
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Bosnian Muslims, the origins of the 
civil war in'yugoslavia suggests a 
multiplicity of cultural-others that 
would have been prone to massacre- 
oriented armed clashes. Through the 
escalating levels of violence in Yugo- 
slavia's tragic disintegration, loyalties 
were short-lived and interchangeable: 
Serbs versus Croats, Croats versus 
Serbs in Croatia and Serbs in Serbia, 
Serbs and Croats versus Bosnian Mus- 
lims, Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian 
Croats versus Serbs, etc. This article 
analyzes the reduction of the multi- 
plicity of Yugoslavia's cultural-others 
to the singular "Muslim" element. To- 
day, the targeted Muslim community 
is that of Bosnian descent, and there 
are strong signs that in a very near fu- 
ture, the Albanian Muslims of Kosovo 
might be subject to similar atrocities. 
Therefore, it is urgent that the Yugo- 
slavian case is analysed in a framework 
which focuses on the problems around 
Bosnia not simply as an episode of con- 
troversial land claims, but as part of a 
cultural and political conviction to- 
wards eliminating the "alien ele- 
ments" in a national p ~ l i t y . ~  
Up to the 1970s, Yugoslavia was re- 
garded as a success story in contradis- 
tinction to the dim economic prospects 
that Eastern European Communism 
seemed to offer. The Yugoslavian 
model symbolised a Third Way be- 
tween Soviet-style centralisation and 
Western market economy. The back- 
ground for Yugoslavia's different im- 
age is the 1948 split between Tito and 
Stalin, which announced Tito's Yugo- 
slavia as liberated from Moscow's dic- 
However, as Lendvai rightfully 
argues, there was more toYugoslavia's 
special status on the international plat- 
form than the economic novelties of 
Yugoslav-style communism (Lendvai 
1991, 152). Yugoslavia was singularly 
identified with a working model of 
federalism which joined together com- 
munities with different linguistic, reli- 
gious and ethnic characteristics. For 
the outsider observant of Yugoslavian 
politics, once its signs were there, the 
collapse of Yugoslavian federalism 
was therefore expected to take place in 
a gradual fashion which wouldn't lead 
into bloodshed. However, the scholars 
and politicians inside the former Yu- 
goslavia have been issuing warnings 
of a fatal civil war soon after Tito's 
death and the practical end of his char- 
ismatic power as the unifying force of 
federalist centralism.' 
The problems concerning the Yugo- 
slavian model of federalism date back 
to the immediate aftermath of the Sec- 
ond World War. After the Second 
World War, Yugoslavia emerged as 
the only "nation" who liberated them- 
selves from Nazism. It also survived 
the civil war between Croats and Serbs 
who were the main antagonists in the 
prewar union of the "SouthSlavs." The 
subsequent re-writings of Yugoslavian 
national history mythologised the suc- 
cess of the strong partisan movement 
against the Nazi invasion, and at- 
tempted to bring together the "na- 
tional minorities' of the new 
Yugoslavia under the rubric of a heroic 
national spirit. However, the narrative 
unity of a people named "Yugoslavs" 
never established a common currency 
other than for the purposes of referring 
to people born into interethnic mar- 
riages, such as Tito himself, or army 
officials, members of the party, and 
state bureaucracy. This paradox of 
"Yugoslavia without Yugoslavs" can 
be explained on the basis of four fac- 
tors.5 
First of all, the unified narrative of a 
strong Yugoslavia did not match with 
the reality of the inter-communal strife 
between the Croats and Serbs who 
supposedly stood at opposite sides 
during the Second World War. In con- 
tradistinction with the official narra- 
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tives of the history of the state of Yugo- 
slavia, the popular culture of Serbian 
nationalism emphasises the "guilty 
consciousness" of the Croats and rein- 
forces depictions of Croats as "a nation 
under probation" (Lendvai 1991,255). 
Secondly, the original premises of 
both Serbian and Croatian nationalism 
were fundamentally at odds with the 
federalist aspirations of a central YU- 
goslavian state. The "Greater Serbia" 
ideal which has emerged out of the 
ruins of the Habsburg Empire at the 
beginning of the twentieth century has 
long dictated that minority communi- 
ties such as Macedonians, Albanians 
in Kosovo, Bosnian Muslims and 
Vojvodinians should be either sup- 
pressed or conciliated. Similar projec- 
tions were spelled out by the "Greater 
Croatia" ideal which dreamt of incor- 
porating Dalmatia and the greater part 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina into a new 
Croatia. Therefore, the six republics 
sanctified by Yugoslavian federalism 
were simultaneously designated as the 
possible preys for a larger Serbia or 
Croatia. 
Thirdly, and finally, related to the 
stand the larger and stronger republics 
took in their relations with the smaller 
ones, gver the years, the national mi- 
nority communities other then the 
Serbs, Croats and Slovens developed 
defensive nationalist agendas as a re- 
sponse to the scenarios of incorpora- 
tion imposed on them from various 
sides of the Yugoslavian national pol- 
ity. The Albanians of Kosovo, Bosnian 
Muslims, and Macedonians-the 
population figures of the first two in- 
cluding significant number of Mus- 
lims-perceived the Yugoslav state 
not necessarily as a protector of equal 
representation and harmonious coex- 
istence. In particular, problems sur- 
rounding the national identity of 
Macedonians were multiplied due to 
Greece's and Bulgaria's open denial of 
the very existence of a people called 
"Macedonians." 
If so, how did the grand ideal of Tito 
for a stronger and unified Yugoslavia 
survive the long decades of ethnic and 
communal strife before the actual 
breakingup caused by the current civil 
war? The answer to this question lies in 
the tensions between the federalist and 
centralist political trends in the former 
Yugoslavia and how these trends were 
operationalized by the League of Com- 
munists of Yugoslavia (LCY). Despite 
the systemic centralisation of the Yu- 
goslav state, the battle through the Tito 
decades (1945-80) over the rights of the 
units of the federal system put the six 
constituent republics of the former 
Yugoslavia in a very precarious situa- 
tion vis-a-vis their relationship with 
each other. 
Following the suppression of the so- 
called "Croatian Spring" of nationalist 
revivalism in 1971-72, the centripetal 
force of the Yugoslav state, the Party 
(LCY), had set its tone of voice in fa- 
vour of ensuring utmost loyalty to the 
federation by all parties involved. 
However, at the level of policy mak- 
ing, instead of restraining the separa- 
tist undercurrents of Yugoslav politics, 
the LCY itself became the arena for the 
staging of savage ethno-nationalist 
conflicts. 
In particular, the referential chan- 
nellingof funds and investments in the 
wake of economic and administrative 
decentralisation heightened the ten- 
sions between "rich" and "poor" re- 
publics. During the long processes of 
decentralisation, what was pejora- 
tively named as localism and 
particularism before became a legiti- 
mate political cause for the capturing 
of competing investment projects. 
Consequently, the differences be- 
tween communists and noncommu- 
nists, or, bureaucrats and members of 
the civil society, were completelyover- 
shadowed by ethno-national alle- 
giances (Lendvai 1991, 257). In other 
words, the so-called Yugoslav solution 
of federalism aggravated the already 
existing tensions between conflicting 
truth claims of ethno-nationalist 
groups within a single party system. 
Over the years, the central state was 
exposed to substantial "Lebanisation" 
of the administrative apparatus, and 
the prospects of democratisation were 
gradually removed from the national 
agenda with the ascendance of Serbian 
officials to all the significant offices in 
the state bureaucracy as well as in the 
national army. After Tito's death in 
1980, the first episode which signalled 
the changing character of ethno-na- 
tionalist claims was the violent erup- 
tion of the demands in Kosovo for an 
autonomous province and equally vio- 
lent crushing of these demands. 
Kosovo wanted not merely defacto but 
de jure constitutional status as a repub- 
lic, and the removal of its formal ties to 
Serbia. (Lendvai 1991, 257; Denitch 
1993,2627). 
The clash between the Albanian 
majority in Kosovo and the Serbian-led 
Belgrade regime promptly fits to 
Kuper's preconditions for genocidal 
tendencies in ethnically polarised soci- 
eties. For Serbian nationalists, the nas- 
cent Albanian nationhood was a threat 
for the memories of Kosovo as the cra- 
dle for the medieval Serbian empire of 
the twelfth to fourteenth centuries. 
Concomitantly, the Albanians of 
Kosovo who were a non8lav people 
with different religious and linguistic 
affinities were identified as dissident 
elements to be dilubed in the federalist 
political scheme. That is to say, prior to 
the actual breaking up of the federal 
system, although the revived hege- 
monical ambitions of Serbian nation- 
alism were becoming identifiably 
strong, they were successfully dis- 
guised by the idiom of the unity and 
totality of the state of Yugoslavia. 
Here, Enloe, Giddens and Zolberg 
are cited as the pathfinders of a new 
theoretical enterprise that is capable of 
analyzing ethnicity in its social, cul- 
tural and historical c~ntextual i ty .~ 
Enloe's works and those of others that 
followed the path that she has opened 
have caused serious controversies 
across the disciplines. The "discovery" 
of the role of supposedly obsolescent 
ethnic communalism in national poli- 
tics and the belated recognition of the 
persistent saliency of ethnic attach- 
ments has raised unsettling ideologi- 
cal and methodological questions 
concerning nationalism. 
From one point of view, race, minor- 
ity status, sectarianism, and regional- 
ism can all impinge on the single 
notion of ethnicity as the new analyti- 
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cal black sheep. Instead of such a nega- 
tive loading of ethnicity, Enloe, as well 
as Ben-Dor, suggests referring to eth- 
nicity as a relational pattern, and thus 
looks at ethnicity as a dynamic phe- 
nomenon.' 
Secondly, Enloe's and Zolberg's 
contributions to the field of critical 
studies of nationalism from the point 
of view of ethnicity are pioneering in 
terms of joining two specific lines of 
inquiry: ethnicity and military studies. 
Enloe, Giddens and Zolberg argue 
that the crisscrossing is ever present 
outside the domain of authoritarian 
societies, since it is the underlying fac- 
tor in consensus building. Concomi- 
tantly, the proposition that ethnic 
identity is a given to which national 
politics can only react is defeated in 
light of how the army and the police 
force systemically reshuffle ethnic cat- 
egories for security and recruitment 
purposes. 
Looking at the same issue from a 
different angle, we can argue that eth- 
nic differentiation, official reinforce- 
ment or denial of ethnic identification, 
and the place of ethnicity in the larger 
framework of nationalism are issues 
that concern the survival of the central 
state apparatus and its legitimacy over 
an assumed national polity. In this 
framework, ethnicity becomes the 
middle term that is placed between 
"nation building" and "state build- 
ing." State-building under the guise of 
nation-building stimulates a unique 
kind of historiography which treats the 
national polity as devoid of ethnic 
characteristics. 
This deletion, however, has never 
been a matter of ignorance. Rather, it is 
a choice made in the name of strength- 
ening the accountability of "national 
citizenry" on the basis of a unified na- 
tional past. As a result, the tradition of 
the modern territorial/nation state 
erodes the location of ethnicity in the 
semantics of politics and culture. As 
such, in national politics, ethnicity is 
primarily claimed to stand for decep- 
tion, ambiguity and euphemism. 
At the surface level, this model cer- 
tainly does not fit to the case of former 
Yugoslavia which was by definition a 
multi-ethnic federalist state. However, 
once we start looking at the contingen- 
cies of ethno-nationalist essentialism 
in each of the six republics that made 
up the federal union, it becomes obvi- 
ous that ethnic purity was a major con- 
cern in inter-republic relations. 
While Slovenia was the closest to 
ethnic homogeneity, neither of the 
other five republics had the demo- 
graphics to support their claims of an 
independent nation-state in a singular 
nationalist idiom. Particularly in 
Bosnia, the population distribution 
echoed the diversity that characterised 
the totality of the former Yugoslavian 
state. Consequently, the dynamics de- 
scribed by the thesis of the ethnocul- 
tural homogenisation of national 
history was put into effect in order to 
clarify the "real" people of Serbia, 
Croatia, and later Bosnia, Kosovo and 
Macedonia. The implications of ethno- 
cultural homogenisation in a multi- 
ethnic setting are very direct in the 
sense that the dominant ethnic group 
defines itself as "the nation" and de- 
grades the other ethnicities into the sta- 
tus of "minorities." This scheme of 
analysis has explanatory power for 
both Croatian and Serbian ethno-na- 
tionalist revivalism. However, for 
Bosnia, we need a much more compli- 
cated account in order to understand 
why the Bosnian Muslims' claim to be 
"the nation" was invalidated by the ri- 
val ethno-nationalist movements of 
the surrounding republics. 
Initially the federalist policies of the 
former Yugoslavia does not seem to 
qualify for a theory of institutionalised 
practices of ethnic privileging and/or 
segregation. However, in reality, the 
gradual increase of Serbian presence 
in the central state apparatus and par- 
ticularly in the national army is very 
suggestive. In the context of the struc- 
tural relationship between military 
development, the strengthening of the 
police force and paramilitary units, 
and, the utilization of ethnic politics for 
the political consolidation of an exclu- 
sive nationalist agenda, the rise of Ser- 
bian nationalism coalesces with the 
changing dynamics of who had the 
most powerful offices in the Yugosla- 
vian central state before its death. For 
Giddens and Zolberg, the nation-state 
model is first and foremost character- 
ised by its absolute command over the 
life and wellbeing of its memberslciti- 
zens, and therefore there is an asym- 
metrical relationship between the 
central state and civil society. 
In the cases of Serbian or Croatian 
leadership of the post-Yugoslavia era, 
this asymmetry has reached to a point 
whereby the territorial aspirations of 
these new states stripped the dissident 
elements in targeted areas from their 
right to live. In other words, during the 
clashes between Serbs and Croats, 
Serbs and Bosnian Muslims, or Croats 
and Bosnian Muslims, mechanisms of 
control over ethnically diversified 
claims of identity turned into episodes 
of war atrocities. As far as the different 
fractions of the civilian population in 
Bosnia are concerned, these atrocities 
in fact assumed a very accumulative 
and repetitive character, which quali- 
fied them for the definition of "ethnic- 
cleansing." 
In the wake of the end of totalitarian 
social and political formations in cen- 
tral-eastern Europe, new forms of na- 
tionalist identity claims and strong 
movements of religious or secular fun- 
damentalism are rapidly filling the 
void left behind the trans-historical 
promises of a "new world order." In 
my view, among other examples, the 
civil war in Yugoslavia proves most 
powerfully that the equation of one 
nation with one nation-state set by the 
European precedent of nationalism, 
involves much more than the liberal- 
democratic idiom of national unity and 
equal participation. The commonly 
espoused argument about Serbian, 
Croat and Bosnian nationalism is that 
Yugoslavia in particular and Eastern 
Europe, Asia, Middle East, Africa, and 
South America in general, accommo- 
date anomalous applications of the 
European nation-state model with dis- 
astrous results. Here, I propose that the 
catastrophic events culminating into 
totalitarian regimes, civil wars and 
episodes of ethnic cleansing are actu- 
ally endemic to the European blue- 
print for discourses of nationalism. 
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The nation-state model and the 
forms of cultural and political domina- 
tion it accommodates prepare the 
ground for the nurturingof authoritar- 
ian cultural traditionsloaded with pas- 
sion for a utopian future unmatched 
with th&egulated promises of consti- 
atriotism and representative 
this context, the resistable 
ascendance of Serbian nationalism can 
not be seen as an anomaly that sets a 
cultural precedent for totalitarian ex- 
pansionism. In other words, the Yugo- 
slav civil war does not necessarily 
qualify for a case of archaic tribal 
claims leading into organized murder. 
Western Europe's own history has 
ample instances that would provide 
the background for the aspirations 
cherished by the orthodoxies of former 
Yugoslavian politics. 
From this point onwards, my pur- 
pose here is to elaborate on overlap- 
ping cultural precedents of the 
elements of intolerance and sociopo- 
litical violence embedded in the histo- 
ries of nationalism in Europe on the 
one hand, and in the former Yugosla- 
via, on the other. 
In the narratives of national history 
as well as in their particularist 
negations based on the revival of ex- 
cluded identity claims, historical 
knowledge claims appear to be the 
battleground for a systematic assimi- 
lation of time and space. As such, a 
rhetorical mastery of the "national 
time" and "national space" becomes 
the tool for the hegemonic construc- 
tion of a specific nationalist ideology. 
For instance, both Serbian and 
Croatian ethno-nationalisms revitalise 
the ideals of ancient Slavic Kingdoms 
as a historical justification (temporal 
aspect) for their territorial expansion- 
ism (spatial aspect). Consequently, the 
juxtaposition of time and space hori- 
zons-history and territory/ historic- 
ity and territoriality-is essential for 
both Hegemonic and counter-hegem- 
onic forms of nationalism for the vali- 
dation of a selective set of identity 
 claim^.^ In turn, the forms of the vali- 
dations of chosenness-if not superi- 
ority-have a common relationship to 
the utilisation of power. 
Gidden's approaches the central 
state not as an almighty political form 
of modernity, but as the centre of cir- 
cumscribed arenas for the generation 
of administrative power, and as the 
locus for the concentration of alloca- 
tive and authoritative resources. 
Giddens thus introduces structural 
and systemic forms of violence into the 
analysis of the central state. 
In this new framework, it is neces- 
sary to think about the level of concen- 
Rhetorical mastery of the 
"national time" and "national 
space" becomes the tool for 
the hegemonic construction of 
a specific nationalist ideology. 
tration of allocative resources as de- 
rivative of the institutional consolida- 
tion of authoritative power. Thereof, 
the concept of surveillance becomes 
crucial for understanding communal 
modes of recording and remembering. 
Surveillance is an indirect or attenu- 
ated use of violence which bridges 
military power with policing power. 
Surveillance can also be instrumental 
in examining the externalised and sys- 
tematised character of information 
gathered for purposes of perpetuation 
of the authority of the central state. 
In the light of the debates on the link- 
ages between institutional and cultural 
dimensions of nationalism, the attain- 
ment of ethno-religious, linguistic, 
economic and territorial integration 
during the initial phases of national- 
ism should be regarded as a geopoliti- 
cal calculation based on the reflection 
of authoritarian power relations over 
allocative ones. The end result of the 
formalisation of this reflection is a fun- 
damental reordering of the civil soci- 
ety. In former Yugoslavian political 
unity, this reordering placed the 
Northern and Christian elements in a 
privileged position v is -h is  the South- 
em and Muslim segments of the feder- 
alist structure. As a result, the 
allocative distribution of resources 
and funds were dictated by the hierar- 
chy of valid ethno-nationalist claims. 
So, the structural premises of the Euro- 
pean nation-state model implied in an 
explicitly multi-ethnic and multina- 
tional context created the conditions 
for the explosion of the Yugoslavian 
federalist system on the grounds of 
separatist and singular ethno-nation- 
alist claims. 
At the beginning of my work, I 
asked why Bosnian claims for au- 
tonomy were degraded to the cries of a 
people without a history as opposed to 
the legitimacy attributed to Croatian 
and Serbian nationalism. I believe the 
answer lies in the original hierarchy of 
the units of the federalist system in the 
former Yugoslavia. Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes identified themselves as the 
true force behiid the nation of "South- 
ern Slavs," and the other components 
of the Yugoslav unity were thus re- 
duced to satellite communities which 
were pulled to the orbit of Slavic unity. 
In particular, the Muslim communities 
were signified as the remnants of the 
Ottoman imperial invasion which 
gave iise to a hybrid population lack- 
ing the true qualities of the Slavic na- 
tions. As such, when the time came for 
breaking up, the scenario was obvious 
for the powerful republics of the 
former Yugoslav unity: those who had 
access to power and who at the same 
time possessed the true characteristics 
of a "Slav nationality" were ready for 
the glories of the independent singular 
nation-states, while those who had 
ethnically and racially mixed popula- 
tion compositions, or those who did 
not have the prerequisites for a true 
"Slav nationality" had to be eaten up 
alive. 
To summarise, the ethnic-cleansing 
of Bosnians in the Yugoslav civil war 
does not seem to be an anomaly at all if 
the ethno-nationalist claims of Serbian, 
Croat and Bosnian nationalism are 
contextualized. During the years of 
federalist power-sharing, the Muslim 
elements were always made to stay at 
the lower echelons of the allocative and 
authoritative power relations. After 
the collapse of the federal, Yugosla- 
via's Christian and Northern commu- 
nities have automatically turned 
against the Southern and Muslim com- 
munities based on the justification that 
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